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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,.
-vs:

Case No.
13751

HARRY MAESTAS,
Defendant-Appellant* V

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Harry Maestas, appeals from a
conviction of second degree murder in the Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Harry Maestas, was convicted
by a jury verdict of second degree murder, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1975), on June 27f
1974.

Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the Utah

State Prison on July 10, 1974, for a term of five years
to life.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks that the jury verdict, and
sentence imposed pursuant thereto, be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 31r 1973, the body of Rosemary
Matteucci was found floating face down in Mill Stream
on the upper Canyon Road in Ogden, Utah (Tr.161-163).
She had been shot once in the head (Tr.584-585).

Later

that day, appellant was arrested and subsequently charged
with first degree murder for the shooting death of Miss
Matteucci.
On June 20, 1974, a jury was selected and
impaneled to try the facts of the case.

Before the

court heard any evidence on June 21st, the son-in-law
of Juror No. 12, Mr. Carpenter brought to the court's
attention that he had had two conversations with his
father-in-law regarding the case:

one about the time

of the crime and the other the night the jury was
impaneled.

At this hearing (Tr.124-140) counsel for

both the defense and for the State questioned Juror
Carpenter and his son-in-law.

After hearing their

testimony, the Court, in its discretion, ruled that
Mr. Carpenter could remain on the jury and denied
appellant's motion for mistrial (Tr.147-148). •
The State introduced evidence that appellant
had committed a robbery at Deamer Finance just shortly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before the murder took place.

The court allowed

the prosecution to introduce this evidence for the
purpose of showing the appellant's motive for killing
Miss Matteucci (Tr.184-188; 259s 19-22; 264-313;
284-287).

It was the State's theory that Miss

Matteucci knew that the appellant had committed the
Deamer Finance robbery and that she had "snitched" to
the police that appellant was responsible for it.

It

was further theorized that appellant, learning that
Miss Matteucci had informed on him, shot her, thus
preventing her from participating further in the
police investigation of the robbery (Tr.184-18 5).

The

defense made objections to the introduction of evidence
relating to the Deamer Finance robbery, but the court
admitted it for the purpose of showing appellant's
motive.
The appellant was found guilty of second degree
murder and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for five
years to life.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF JURY MISCONDUCT.
Respondent does not refute the general rule
that jurors are not permitted to speak with third persons
or witnesses and that such conduct is presumptively
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prejudicial.

This presumption is, however, rebuttable
by showing the communications were harmless and did
not thereby prejudice defendant's rights.

Johnson

v. United States, 207 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1953),
cert, denied 547 U.S. 938, 98 L.Ed. 1087f 74 S.Ct.
632.*

Respondent contends that the State overcame

this presumption in the trial court.

In the instant

case, the son-in-law of juror number 12, Mr.
Carpenter, came forward with the information that he
had discussed the case with Mr. Carpenter on two
occasions:

once about the time of the murder and

the second time the night the jury was impaneled.
(Tr.125; 14-18; 126; 5-9). Juror Carpenter was
questioned by counsel for the defense and for the
State the next morning before the trial commenced
(Tr. 124; 7-12).
The record discloses that Mr. Carpenter's
son-in-law, Bradley Dee, learned that his father-inlaw had been impaneled as a juror in the Maestas case
and went to his house to tell him he should not be
a juror because of their conversation several months
earlier (Tr.137;- 1-8). Under examination Carpenter
stated he could not remember if the appellant's name
had been mentioned in the first conversation (Tr.127;

*Ellis v. State of Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352
(10th Cir. 1970), cert, denied 401 U.S. 1010, 28
L.Ed.2d 546,
91the Howard
S.Ct.
1260.
Digitized by
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14-19.

He couldn' t remember when that conversation took

place; (Tr,128; 11-18) nor could he recall who was
present during the conversation (Tr.128; 25-27).
Mr. Carpenter summed up his recollection of that first
conversation by saying:
"I had pretty much forgotten
about it and it was just this
reminder that just brought it
back, this flash memory but I
wouldnft even remember had I not
been called to jury. . . I recall
hearing the name Maestas and
this brought back a memory when
I heard it yesterday." (Tr.129;
11-19) .
Mr. Carpenter was consistent in his attitude
toward his responsibilities as a juror.

Under questioning

he said he had formed no opinion as to the case (Tr.
130; 24-29); he stated he was not prejudiced or biased
toward the defendant (Tr.133; 1-3); and he expressed
that he wanted to be fair to both sides (Tr.133; 9-11).
At one point Mr. Carpenter did say that he
would "probably not" want a juror with his frame of
mind to sit on his case were the positions reversed,
but this was in answer to a rather vague and complicated
question posed by defense counsel (Tr.130; 15-20); also,
Mr. Carpenter later addressed himself to that same
question posed by the prosecutor:

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Juror Carpenter: I feel like I
could (be a fair and impartial
juror). The question that Mr.
Athay asked about, whether Maestas
would perfer me to be on the jury,
I can appreciate his position there
and I know if I do serve on the jury
that I'll tell him personally that
I will be as fair as I possibly can.
*

*

*

Mr. Newey: In this specific case
now,- knowing based on all of the
questions that you have been asked
by Mr. Athay and myself, do you feel
that a man in your frame of mind would
give Mr. Maestas a fair trial?
Juror Carperter: Yes sir, I believe
I could."
(Tr.133; 12-30; 134:
1-17) .
Additionally, Bradley Dee, Carpenter's sonin-law was questioned and even he was uncertain as
to what was said in his first conversation with Carpenter
regarding the Matteucci murder:

he was unable to

recall when the conversation took place (Tr.137:
21-30 and 138: 1-4), who was present during the conversation (Tr. 138: 5-7), how long the conversation
lasted (Tr. 139: 14-20), nor could he remember with
any particularity what he told his father-in-law
about the case (Tr. 138: 14-29).
What the State proved to overcome the presumption is that Mr. Carpenter did not remember clearly
the conversation with his son-in-law about the time
of the murder and that he did not think it important

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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enough to mention while he was being polled as a
juror*

The State proved that his recollection did

not have sufficient impact to influence him as a
juror and that he had formed no opinion as to the
case.

Juror Carpenter showed himself to be capable

and anxious to try the case solely on the evidence
that was presented, being fair to both sides.
In his argument, appellant relies on Remitter
v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 98 L.Ed. 654, 74 S.Ct.
450 (1954).

In Remmer, an unnamed person communicated

with a juror who later became foreman, the stranger
stating that the juror could profit by bringing in a
verdict favorable to the petitioner in that case.
Further, the petitioner did not learn of this occurrence
until reading about it in the newspaper after the guilty
verdict was already turned in.

In Remmer, the Court

was concerned about the investigation the FBI conducted
regarding this incident during the course of the trial,
the Court expressing that this conduct was:
". . . bound to impress the juror
and is apt to do so unduly. A
juror must feel free to exercise
his functions without the FBI or
anyone else looking over his
shoulder. . . ." Ibid. 347 U.S.
at 229, 230. , •
Clearly there is not the intrusion nor danger of
influence in the instant case as that concerning the
Court in Remmer.*

In the case at bar the juror had

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

*Also, since
the defense
did
Machine-generated
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errors.not learn of the case

trouble even remembering the incident in controversy.
Then too, by questioning Mr. Carpenter and his sonin-law, the Court could determine if there was any
prejudice on the juror's part.
The discharge or retention of a juror for
misconduct during the course of a trial and the
question whether a 'motion for mistrial should be
granted are matters wholly within the discretion of
the trial court.

Bacino v. United States, 316 F.2d

11 (10th Cir. 1963), cert, denied, U.S. 831, 11 L.Ed.2d
62, 84 S.Ct. 76, and Brown v. United States, 380 F. 2d
477 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 962, 19
L.Ed.2d 1158, 88 S.Ct. 1062.

It is a rule of long-

standing that a trial court's discretionary ruling
should not be overturned unless the trial court
abuses its discretion.*

The trial court should look

at the circumstances in their entirety:
"The trial court should not decide
and take final action ex parte on
information such as was received in
this case, but should determine the
circumstances, the impact thereof upon
the juror, and whether or not it was
prejudicial, in a hearing with all
interested parties permitted to participate." Remmer v. United States, infra#
at 230.
-Moore v.~?eopls, 125 Colo., 306, 243 P,2d
425 (1952).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant cites Stone v. United States, 113
F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940) and United States v. Ferguson,
486 P.2d 968 (6th C i r . 1973) in support of his contention that the State failed to overcome the presumption
of prejudice.

While it is true that Stone and Ferguson

are examples of instances where the jurors were
sufficiently infected by suspicions and disturbances
during the respective trials to warrant mistrials, the
facts comprising those two cases go far beyond the
wo ta] ks "between M r . Carpenter and 1 lis son-in-] aw
in the case at b a r .

In Stone, thirty witnesses testified

about an effort to bribe one of the jurors.
was removed and replaced by an alternate.

This juror
The judge

then questioned the entire jury as to whether any had
been contacted by ai i oi itsider.

The defense claimed

that the suspicion was raised in the minds of those
remaining that the defendant had instigated some in
proper ac t i oi i a nd tha 1 : t 1 Ie j udge * s exp 1 oi at ion had
the effect of "coercing the jurors and depriving them
of their independent judgment in deciding the case."
:cL ,

1 ] 3 F.2d a i 7 7. .

...; ' '• ' . •

"..,.-•• •.-.."••'.••'• '/'.' '

In United States v. Fergn :m, supra, a juror,
Austin, had been invited to a friend's house and there
he talked about the case.

He admitted having discussed

the case but denied he had talked with any of the jurors

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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about it.

Austin was excused and the remaining jurors

were told Austin had social contact with a person who
knew the defendant.

A juror later testified that

Austin had talked twice with him and possibly another
juror the day after his contact with the defendant's
friend.

The reviewing Court considered the effect

of the polling of the jurors as to their conduct;
the court decided that polling, together with the
remarks by Austin created prejudice.

The court

emphasized:
"Unfortunately, the matter did
not come to the attention of
the court until after Austin had
already discussed the case with
other jurors. By then it was too
late." Id. 486, F.2d at 972.
What particularly concerned the courts in
the two preceding cases was that the entire jury was
-affected in such a way as to raise suspicions in their
minds that the defendants might have acted in some
improper manner.

There is no such problem in the

instant case as the matter is isolated to the statements
made by Mr. Carpenter's son-in-law some months earlier
of which Mr. Carpenter had only a bare recollection at
the time he was impaneled.

These circumstances do not

bring this case under the umbrella of protection which is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10-

intended by the granting of a motion for mistrial.
The trial court properly weighed the testimony of Mr.
Carpenter and his son-in-law and correctly determined
that no prejudice resulted to the defendant by
allowing Juror Carpenter to remain impaneled.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF
OTHER CRIMES INTO EVIDENCE TO SHOW APPELLANT'S MOTIVE
FOR THE HOMICIDE OF ROSEMARY MATTEUCCI.
The trial court allowed the State to admit
evidence showing that the appellant committed a robbery
of a finance company a few days before Rosemary Matteucci's
homicide for the purpose of showing the appellant's motive
for committing that homicide.

The State introduced evidence

showing that Rosemary Matteucci knew appellant committed
this robbery and that she had picked out his photograph for
the police, knowing that the appellant was a robbery suspect
and said words to the effect that he was "real active in the
area." (Tr.276: 9-12).

Witness Cragun also testified that

she said, "something about that when you get him on the
robbery, you will clear some more robberies." (Tr.284: 1-2).
Further, the State proved that appellant Maestas knew she
had talked with the police and that she had "snitched" on
him.

Witness William Caffall stated that appellant told

him in an elevator after his arrest: ". . * but Harry said
he knew Rosemary was telling." (Tr.365: 13-15; 369: 20-22).
Generally, evidence of other crimes committed by a
defendant is not admissible; there are, however, exceptions
to this rule:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The long-established rule,
accordingly, forbids the prosecution,
unless and until the accused gives
evidence of his good character, to
introduce initially evidence of the
bad character of the accused. It is
not irrelevant, but in the setting of
jury trial the danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value.
The danger is at its highest
when character is shown by other
criminal acts, and the rule about the
proof of other crimes is but an application of the wider prohibition against
the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence of bad character. The
rule is that the prosecution may not
introduce evidence of other criminal acts
of the accused unless the evidence is
substantially relevant for some other
purpose than to show a probability that he
committed the crime on trial because he is
a man of criminal character. There are
numerous other purposes for which evidence
of other criminal acts may be offered, and
when so offered the rule of exclusion is
simply inapplicable." McCormick on Evidence,
2d Ed., § 190 at 447,448. (Emphasis added.)
The State argued for the admission of this evidence
en the ground that It was to show motive on the part of
c:o f erv'l ;••; • :-=d o s r.. is , .i nd t h e t:i: i ^ 1 < 'ouri nj 1 ed in fa
admission on tils ground.

This is cri'? of the exceptions

to the rule stated above.

The prosecution is entitled,

To establish motive.

,r

vb)

This in turn may serve as evidence of

the identity of the doer of the crime on charge, or of
d e 1 :i b e i: a t e n e s s , m a 1 1 c e , o :i : a s p e c :i f i c :i n t e n t c o n s t i * • - i n g
an element of the crime-"

Id., § ] 90(6), at: 45 0,4-
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The Utah Supreme Court heard arguments on the
question of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes
for proof of motive in the very recent case of State v.
Schieving, 535 P.2d

1232 (Utah 1975).

The Court held

that no prejudice resulted in defendant's trial for mishandling public monies where testimony was admitted as
to another shortage of funds in his department:
"The general rule is that in
a criminal case evidence which shows
or tends to show that the defendant had
committed another crime in addition to
that for which he is on trial is
inadmissible. However, an exception
to the rule is that evidence of another
crime is admissible when it tends to
establish motive; intent; absence of
mistake or accident; or to show a
common scheme or plan embracing the
commission of similar crimes so related
to each other that the proof of one
tends to establish the crime for which
the defendant is on trial." Id.. , 535
P.2d at 1233. (Emphasis added.)
The Court's ruling in the Schieving case merely
reaffirms its position on this question, for the Court has
similarly held in State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d
756 (1953), cert, denied, Neal v. Graham, 348 U.S. 982,
99 L.Ed. 765, 75 S.Ct. 573; State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225,
192 P.2d 861 (1948); and State v. Pollock, 102 Utah 587,
129 P.2d 554 (1942).

See also State v. Harries, 118 Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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260, 221 P. 2d 605 (1950), and State v. Kappas, iuO Mt.,th .:*/.*,
114 P.2d

205

(1 9 45) . '

Additionally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled on this question in Pappas v. United States, 216 F.2d
515 (10th Cii

1954) :
The general rule is that evidence
of former offenses is not admissible to
establish an offense charged in the
indictment or information. But there are
well recognized exceptions to the rule,
one of which is that such evidence is
competent to prove motive or intent."
Id., 216 F.2d at 519,

See also Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d
19 7 2 ) ; United States v. Freeman, 514

',/<.

8.; .' (;).i , C u .
*

" : ..-

1 9 7 5 ) ; and United States v. Stevens, 452 f.2d 63 3 (lCth
Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) . .
Appellant argued that the evidence that was admitted
as to other crimes was for the purpose of disgracing him and
making 1

:

like a man of evil cl laracter.

3<nsporjer«t

agrees that if that had been the purpose for admitting the
evidence then it would properly have been excluded according
to State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 45] P.2d 772

(1 969); but '

this was not the purpose for which the evidence was admitted,
as the record clearly reveals

(Tr.184-188; Arguments and court's

ruling on first objection to the introduction of evidence of
other crimes; Tr.259: 19-22; 264-313; 284-287).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It was not wise for appellant to rely on State
v. Lopez, supra, because that case tends to support
respondent's position.

In Lopez, the Court was concerned

with whether receiving testimony concerning stolen articles
retrieved from the defendant's car related to another
crime and whether this was a proper admission.

The Utah

Supreme Court held that it was admissible in that case
because it was relevant to "explain the circumstances
surrounding the instant crime."

Ici. , 451 P.2d at 775.

The remaining Ccises cited and relied upon by
appellant do not address the question whether it is
proper to admit evidence of other crimes for the purpose
of showing motive.

State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d

407 (1963)/ reversed the conviction of a man who had been
convicted of assault with intent to commit murder and
robbery where evidence had been admitted that the defendant
had been arrested for criminal offenses in other states.
There was no indication that the prosecution used this to
show the defendant's motive or for any other purpose which
would bring the case under an evidentiary exception.
Correctly, therefore, the Court held that prejudicial error
resulted because the evidence had "no other effect than to

-16-
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degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impression
he had a propensity for crime."

Ld., 382 P.2d at 409.

(Emphasis added.)
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in State v> Dickson,
12 Utah 2d 8f 361 P.2d 412 (1961), itself distinguished between
a case where the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose
of showing motive and where no such purpose was present:
"A comment is in order in regard
to State v. Neal, decided by this court,
which is relied on by the State as
justifying the questioning of the
defendant as to being charged with another
felony. While it is true that we there
approved questioning the defendant concerning his being charged with robberies
for which he had not been convicted, that
case stands for no such broad rule that it
may be done generally; and it should not be
extended beyond its true holding. The
dangers of injustice in admitting evidence
concerning other crimes must be recognized.
The universally accepted general rule
is that such evidence is not admissible if
its effect is merely to disgrace the defendant
or show his propensity to commit crime. However, where evidence has special relevancy
to prove the crime of which the defendant
stands charged, it may be allowed for that
purpose; and the fact that it shows another
crime will not render the evidence inadmissible.
The justification given in the Neal case was
that the evidence was deemed relevant to show
Neal's motive for killing. The victim was a
peace officer who was attempting to take him
into custody. It was held proper to show that
Neal was a fugitive from justice wanted on
charges of robbery in California who would be
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trying desperately to avoid capture by
police and would therefore have a strong
motive for killing the officer. No such
special justifying circumstance existed
here.
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any
degree of assurance that.there would not
have been a different result in the absence
of the error in cross examining the defendant
about the incident in Texas, it must be
regarded as prejudicial and the case remanded
for a new trial. That being so, we deem it our
duty to comment on additional matters raised
on this appeal which may prove helpful in the
further proceedings in this cause." Id.,
361 P.2d at 415.
The other cases cited by appellant in Point II can be
similarly refuted for appellant is arguing apples when the
issue really is oranges.

The record reveals the arguments

for and against the admission of this evidence, and it clearly
shows the basis for the court's decision.
Appellant alternatively argues that the degree and
extent of the evidence was so great as to unduly prejudice
appellant.

This argument is without merit.

The trial court

has discretion as to how much evidence is admissible.

In

Stratton v. United States, 387 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1968), the
reviewing court held that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting testimony of eighteen government
witnesses as to transactions they had with the defendant
which were similar to those for which the defendant was
charged for the purpose of showing plan, motive, scheme or
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design.

In the instant case, according to the appellant's

own statement of the facts, only five witnesses testified
in regards to the alleged robbery.

Clearly, if eighteen

witnesses do not constitute prejudicial error, five
witnesses do not even come close.

Further, the testimony

of those five witnesses comprises only sixty-five pages
out of 883 for the entire trial transcript and not all of
those sixty-five pages is devoted to evidence of other
crimes.
Respondent submits that the evidence relating to
other crimes that was admitted clearly met the established
standards governing such admissibility, and appellant has
failed to show any abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in allowing the introduction of it.

This court

should not disturb the decision of the trial court.
POINT III
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS JUSTIFYING
A REVERSAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.
•

The doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair,

3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some instances
errors, which when standing alone would not justify reversal,
may have such a cumulative effect so as to deprive the accused
of a fair trial, is not disputed by respondent.

However,

respondent submits that the instant case does not meet the
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degree of error and criteria set forth in State v. St. Clair,,
supra.

The duty of the appellant is set forth at 3 Utah 2d

244:
"On the basis of such appraisal,
if the court can say with assurance that
the evidence of the defendants1 guilt
was so clear and convincing that no
reasonable jury could be expected to
return a different verdict, even in the
absence of the irregularities, then the
errors would be harmless and the verdict
should be permitted to stand. On the
other hand, if there is reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of the
errors a different verdict might have
been rendered, a new trial should be
granted." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case there is no cumulation of errors
so as to jusify a conclusion that a different verdict would
have been reached by the jury in the absence of such errors.
In State v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of errors
supported this court's finding that it was reasonably likely
the verdict of the jury would have been different but for the
errors.

However, the alleged errors in the instant case do

not justify such a conclusion.
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has precluded
appellant from having a fair trial first necessitates a conclusion that errors were committed.

Respondent submits that

this is not the case and that State v. St. Clair, supra, is
clearly distinguishable.
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Respondent submits that this court should follow
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964),
wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170:
"Under our statute [Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-42-1 (1953)], which requires that
errors which do not affect the essential
rights of the parties be disregarded, we
cannot properly interfere with the jury's
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole
case it should appear that there was error
of sufficient gravity that the defendant's
rights were prejudiced in some substantial
way. We have found nothing of any such
consequence here." (Emphasis added.)
Respondent submits that a review of the whole record
requires a conclusion that the appellant received a fair trial
and that no error was committed that prejudiced appellant in
a substantial way.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the jury was convinced from the
evidence adduced at the trial of the appellant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.

The record substantiates and necessitates

a conclusion that no error was committed that resulted in a
harmful prejudice to the appellant.

Therefore, respondent

submits that appellant's contentions are wholly without merit
and that the conviction be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney General
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